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COMMENTS
. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: DOES IT
APPLY TO CORPORATIONS?
INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege originated during the reign of Elizabeth I.
At early common law it was the privilege of the lawyer, and he alone
could assert it "to protect his faith and honor."' In the eighteenth cen-
tury a purpose to protect the client began to emerge. Today the privilege
lies with the client and facilitates his free consultation with counsel by
removing any apprehension that information which he confided to the
attorney could be discovered and used against him.2 It is hoped that this
full disclosure will aid in the administration of justice and encourage
compliance with the law,3 for, absent the privilege "everyone would be
thrown upon his own legal resources. Deprived of all professional assist-
ance, a man would not venture to consult any skillful person, or would
only dare to tell his counsellor half his case."'4
All communications with counsel, however, are not protected by the
privilege. Only those confidential disclosures made while seeking legal
advice from a lawyer in his capacity as such cannot be uttered by the at-
torney without the consent of the client.5 While the qualification neces-
sary to be considered an attorney for the purpose of exercising the privi-
lege have been long settled, critical judicial investigation into the question
of who can qualify as a client has only recently begun.
The first reported judicial analysis of the right of the corporate client
to claim the attorney-client privilege, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n,6 resulted in a denial of the corporation's claim. This decision
caused a tremor in both the bench and the bar because of the assumption
by many that both corporations and individuals enjoyed the same privi-
lege.7 Indeed, even Chief Judge Campbell, who rendered the controversial
opinion, confessed in indulging in this assumption prior to his exhaustive
research, when he was unable "to find any authority ...wherein the
18 WIGMoR , EVIDrNCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE).
2 8 WIGMORE § 2290. See also. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 210, comment a (1942).
3 8 WIGMORE § 2291.
4 Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 My. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833). Quoted with
approval in Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175, 192-93 (1865).
5 8 WIGMoRE S.2292.
6207 F. Supp. 771, adhered to on rehearing 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. 111. 1962).
7 The attorney-client privilege has been defined as "A communication made to a
counsel, solicitor, or attorney in professional confidence and which he is not per-
mitted to disclose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th cd. 1951).
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courts decided that this privilege should be extended to corporations.",,
The Judge further concluded that in the past the corporation's right to
claim the privilege had been assumed without a proper reliance on stare
decisis or a clear legal analysis of the issues involved.9
The Radiant Burners decision encouraged litigants in several other ac-
tions to seek discovery from corporations of what were heretofore con-
sidered privileged communications. 10 The rulings in these cases showed a
reluctance to follow the lead of Radiant Burners." The question is now
before the appellate courts, and every indication is that a trip to the Su-
preme Court will be necessary for a final determination.
A better understanding of the problems encountered in resolving this
issue can be gained if the arguments supporting each position are known.
These arguments will be presented, therefore, before any attempt will be
made to suggest a solution. Each position will be presented separately in
disputatious form to retain some semblance of rational development.
THE CORPORATION Is NOT A CLIENT
While the proponents of the privilege urge that in several reported de-
cisions12 the privilege "was treated" as applicable, this "treatment" con-
sisted, at most, of a naked assumption.'8 Many of these decisions were not
involved with the same issue for which they are cited as precedent, and
are, therefore, without any controlling value in the determination of this
problem. 14 The only function these cases serve is to show that the assump-
tion that corporations enjoyed the privilege was widespread.
Both the Model Code of Evidence' 5 and the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence' 6 list the terms "corporation" and "association" within their defini-
S Radiant Buniers, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 772 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
9 Ibid.
1OPhiladelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962);
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962);
U.S. v. Becton Dickinson, 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962).
11 This reluctance was best expressed by Judge Kirkpatrick: "His [Judge Camp-
bell] opinion is supported by a good deal of history and sound logic, but the availa-
bility of the privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged so long and has been so
generally accepted that I must recognize that it does exist." Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
12 See list of cases in note 39, below.
13 This was admitted by Judge Kirkpatrick, as quoted in note 11.
14 E.g. United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915) was
concerned with a grant of investigatory power to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and was resolved by an analysis of the specific statutory grant.
15 Rule 209 (1942).
16Rule 26 (3) (1953).
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tion of the term client, as that term is used with reference to the attorney-
client privilege. These, however, have no value in jurisdictions where
they have not been formally adopted, for "both works.., set forth what
the law should be and not necessarily what the law is."'17
A widespread assumption that a privilege did in fact exist should not be
the basis for a grant of the privilege. While some customs may attain the
force of law in certain circumstance, it is essential that the custom be
certain in its application.' 8 In the instant problem, the high degree of un-
certainty in the determination of who, in fact, in the corporate structure
qualifies as the client would be fatal to any claim that the custom had
evolved into law.
Since 1906 the United States Supreme Court limited the privileges avail-
able to the corporate or collective body.19 There has also been an increas-
ing tendency to emphasize full and frank discovery while limiting tech-
nicality and concealment. Both these trends are diametrically opposed to
the assumption that the corporate client has a right to claim the attorney-
client privilege.
THE NATURE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege, like the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, is personal in nature, and cannot be claimed by an impersonal entity.
The rationale of the attorney-client privilege is the facilitation of com-
munication with counsel.20 This is accomplished by removing any appre-
hension on the part of the client that his confidences could later be used
to bring about his incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination
bars discovery of these confidences from the client, while the attorney-
client privilege thwarts any attempt to turn the consultation with counsel
into a conduit of self-incrimination. Thus these two privileges are similar
in both their basic purpose and their personal nature.21
While there never had been a reported decision in which the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege to the corporate client had been
squarely placed in issue prior to Radiant Burners, the analogous protec-
tion against self-incrimination has been frequently discussed and denied
to an impersonal entity.
The inherently personal nature of the privilege, and the fallacy of ex-
17 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 209 F. Supp. at 323 (N.D. 11. 1962).
18 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, I, as quoted in READINGS IN THE HISTORY AND
SYSTEMSiS OF THE COMMON LAW 3 ed. (1927).
19 E.g. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); United States v. White, 332 U.S. 694 (1944).
20 8 I,IGMORE S 2290.
21 Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication between Lawyer and Client,
16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 490 (1928).
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tending such a right to a collective entity, was the principal foundation of
the Court's opinion in United States v. White.22
Individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be said
to be exercising their purely personal rights and duties nor be entitled to their
purely personal privilege. Rather they assume the rights, duties, and privileges
of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers. 28
The court later set down a guide to be followed in determining what as-
sociations are so impersonal in their nature as to be excluded from the
protection of personal privileges.
The test, rather, is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that
a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the
purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody
their common or group interests only. If so, the privilege cannot be invoked on
behalf of the organization or its representatives in their official capacity.2 4
The analogy between the two privileges is clear. Because of their in-
herently personal nature neither should be extended to an impersonal cor-
porate entity which is manifestly an embodiment of collective interests.
Public policy considerations also weigh heavily against the application
of a rule of immunity, basically personal in character, to a state-created
entity. The corporation is a creature of the state which is presumed to be
incorporated for a public benefit.25 Certain special privileges and fran-
chises are held by it, subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of
its charter. "It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the
exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been em-
ployed, and whether they had been abused .... ,,21
While an individual may lawfully frustrate discovery of incriminatory
evidence, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privi-
leges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an
abuse of such privileges.
THE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT
One of the basic common law requisites for a claim of the attorney-
client privilege is confidentiality.27 Traditionally, this requirement is predi-
cated upon a disclosure in confidence and both the intention and the
22322 U.S. 694 (1944). The privilege was denied to a labor union.
23 Id. at 699.
24 Id. at 701. See also 8 WIaroRE S 2259a.
25 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
26 d. at 74-5. 27 8 WIGMORE S 2292.
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ability to maintain this secrecy in the future. If at any time the matter
which was communicated in confidence is "profaned" by transmission to
a third person the protection is lost. "The moment confidence ceases,
privilege ceases."'28 This much is universally conceded.29
The impossibility of a corporation of any magnitude complying with
the traditional confidentiality requirement is the most insurmountable bar
to any attempt to include corporations within the ambit of "client" for
the purpose of claiming the privilege. The proponents of the corporate
client's claim face the problem of both defining and confining confiden-
tiality. Whose confidence gives rise to the privilege, and whose commu-
nication may profane it?
In the Radiant Burners decision many of the difficulties encountered in
determining what persons in the corporate structure hold its confidence,
and might, therefore, be considered to be the client, were discussed.80 Is
the scope of the term so narrow as to include only the president, or so
broad as to include all employees? Chief Judge Campbell was of the opin-
ion that the group which would best qualify as the client for this purpose
must be the stockholders, for the privilege is actually asserted for their
benefit as owners.3 '
A short period after the Radiant Burners decision a Pennsylvania Fed-
eral District Court was faced with a similar problem. It was there held that
the attorney-client privilege will exist only if the employee has actual
authority to control or to take a substantial part in whatever action the
corporation may take in response to advice sought from the lawyer.8 2
Other authorities have attempted to circumscribe those persons in a cor-
porate structure who come within the ambit of the term client for the
purpose of the privilege. With each attempt the scope of the term fluctu-
ates .8
Wigmore argues that special exceptions or privileges inhibiting full dis-
closure of the truth must be confined to the narrowest scope "consistent
with the logic of the principle. 8 4 He further describes the attorney-client
privilege as "an exception to the general duty to disclose" whose "benefits
are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. '"88
28 Parlahurst v. Lowten, 2 Swanst. 194, 216, 36 Eng. Rep. 589, 596 (Ch. 1819).
2 9 8 WxcMoRE § 2311.
301Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D. I11.
1962).
31 Id. at 774.
82Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485, (E.D. Pa.
1962).
33 Different approaches to the problem are analyzed in Simon, The Attorney-Client
Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 953 (1956).
84 8 WGMORE S 2291. 85 Ibid.
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Such an obstruction to the administration of justice should not be per-
mitted if the identity of persons who have a right to claim it is specula-
tive, and dependent upon a definition of the courts in each instance.
It would be equally unwise to permit the corporation to designate the
person to act as its spokesman, or to adopt any disclosures made for it as
privileged. This would extend the privilege far beyond that now allowed
to the individual client.86
Further problems in confidentiality are presented by the right of the
shareholder and the state of incorporation to examine the records of the
corporation. Confidentiality is traditionally predicated upon a reasonable
expectancy that the secrecy of the communication will be maintained.
"Surely one who voluntarily places a document in a position where it is
subject to inspection by other persons can hardly be said to have reason-
ably intended to retain the secrecy of the document, notwithstanding the
document having actually retained this non-intended secrecy."3 7 Certainly
the state is without the term "client," and many authorities would also
exclude the stockholders from this designation. Hence their unchallenged
right to inspection must be considered a profanation of any confidential
transmission and result in the destruction of any possible claim of privi-
lege.
THE CORPORATION Is A CLIENT
Although only one case has specifically held that the attorney-client
privilege extends to corporations as a matter of the common law, 8 many
have referred to its existence as a matter of common knowledge. 39 One
36 Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L. J.
953 (1956).
37 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
38 American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
39 United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); Wonneman
v. Stratford Securities Co., Inc., 23 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Elis-Foster Co. v.
Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1958); International
Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Golding-Keene Co., 162 F. Supp. 137 (W.D.N.Y.
1958); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Comercio E. Industria Continental v. Dresser Industries Inc., 19 F.R.D. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio Corporation v. Radio Corporation of America, 121 F.
Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); Willard C. Beach Air Brush Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
118 F. Supp. 242 (D.N.J. 1953); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 13 F.R.D.
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Shawmut Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488 (D.
Mass. 1952); A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); Bliss v. Cold Metal
Process Co., 1 F.R.D. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1940); Edison Electric Light Co. v. U.S. Elec-
tric Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1890). An interesting state case is Ex Parte
Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
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case has stated in a strong dictum that corporations have the privilege;40
another has held it applicable under a controlling New Jersey Statute.41
Judge Medina, in A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr,42 contended that:
the legal rights and duties of large corporations and those who dispute with
them would not be susceptible of judicial administration in the absence of law-
yers, nor, in the absence of the privilege could lawyers properly represent their
clients. I am, frankly, hesitant to do anything which would contribute to the
undermining of the protection afforded by the time-honored rule which ex-
cludes from evidence such confidential communications.48
The reason that there had been no reported decision prior to Radiant
Burners pertaining to the right of the corporation to claim the attorney-
client privilege in which the matter was expressly argued and decided is
clear: neither the bench nor the bar challenged the corporation's assertion
of the protection. When the corporation relied upon the privilege there
was but a brief statement in the reported decision that the information
sought was protected.44 Even this assumption is of value, however, for the
common law is not a rigid body of principles. The usages and customs of
a period have a controlling influence, for the common law evolves to fit
the times.45 When the corporation was created the then-existing attorney-
client privilege was influenced by this new creation. The long period in
which the courts have recognized the corporation as a "client" serves to
point up the fact that the privilege has adapted to include corporations
within the scope of its protection.
In discussing the attorney-client privilege the Model Code of Evidence
defines the client as "a person or corporation or other association .... 46
A similar statute has been enacted in several states.47 Many law review
commentators, also, have recited that the attorney-client privilege applies
to corporations as a matter of common understanding. 4 That the attor-
ney-client privilege includes corporations, therefore, has been well estab-
40Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
41 United States v. Becton Dickinson, 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962).
4295 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 197 F. 2d 498 (2 Cir.),
cert. den. 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
431d. at 102. 44 See list of cases in note 39.
4 5 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
46 MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENcE rule 209 (1942). The introduction at p. viii states that
the Code is a restatement of the common law unless there is an accompanying pro-
vision which explains that the rule changes the common law. Rule 209 contains no
such provision. The writers, therefore, thought that they were restating the common
law on this point.
47E.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 84A-20 (3).
48Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L. J.
953, 990 (1956); Comment, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 235, 241 (1961); Comment, 71 YALE L. J.
1226, 1241-43 (1962). See also 8 WIGMORE S 2292.
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lished by cases, restaters, texts, statutes, and the common understanding of
bench and bar.
THE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENT
The common law rules of confidentiality were developed with refer-
ence to individual clients. There is no basic conflict, however, between
the complex organization of the corporation and this traditional require-
ment.
The right of a shareholder to inspect documents does not preclude an
assertion of the privilege by the corporation. Inspection must be for a
proper purpose and reasonably related to the interest of the shareholder.49
It is doubtful, therefore, that access could be gained to privileged matter
without proof of a specific need.50 This remote possibility of disclosure
should not destroy confidentiality. A sounder approach to the question of
confidentiality would be to consider each document separately, and per-
mit discovery of only those which had, in fact, been profaned.
To permit corporate clients to avail themselves of the attorney-client
privilege does not insulate all their records or activities from disclosure or
create a "zone of silence." Corporate agents can always be called to testify
as to facts within their own knowledge. 5' There is no basis for the sug-
gestion that the attorney-client privilege might be employed by a corpo-
ration to make any desired part of its corporate papers immune to legal
process simply by depositing them with the corporation's lawyers. The
privilege cannot be invoked merely by making an attorney custodian of
documents for his clients.52 Only those communications are privileged
which constitute a submission of a matter to an attorney for legal advice
or the rendition of legal services.
THE NATURE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The denial of the privilege against self-incrimination to the corpora-
tion55 does not afford a reason for denying the attorney-client privilege.
The purposes and reasons for the two privileges are different, and an
analogy between them cannot be drawn. The attorney-client privilege is
based upon social policy, in the belief that justice will be better admin-
istered if the client can make complete disclosures to his attorney. The
privilege against self-incrimination, different in origin and function, pre-
vents torture and browbeating; 54 it is a purely personal privilege.55
Thus, there is a basic difference between the two privileges. The at-
49 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, S § 160-61 (rev. ed. 1946).
50 5 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2217-26.4 (Wolf repl. vol. 1952).
5' 8 WGMORE § 2291 at 554.
52 Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); 8 WGMORE S 2307.
5 3 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-84 (1911).
54 8 WIGMORE S 2250. 55 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944).
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torney-client privilcge was designed to encourage clients to disclose in-
formation to their attorney The privilege against self-incrimination was
created to discourage tie forceable disclosure of evidence which would
be incriminating to the individual. Physical force, by its very nature, can
be applied only to natural persons. The facilitation of full disclosure,
however, is desirable whether the client is a corporation or an individual.
CONCLUSION
The size and complexity of the modern corporation mitigate against
extension to them of a right which was developed and refined for an
individual. It is impossible to tailor corporate action to conform to the
historically essential requirement of confidentiality without a clear def-
inition of who will be considered the "client."
Any distortion of the privilege to remedy these problems would be
unwise, for then the corporation would enjoy a more liberal area of
protection than is currently available to the individual client when he
avails himself of the attorney-client privilege. The corporation thus would
assume a more favorable position than the individual solely because of
the complex nature of the corporate organization.
While the corporation does not enjoy the privilege as it has existed at
common law, it shares with the individual the need for free communica-
tion with counsel. To facilitate these disclosures, some form of privilege
should be granted.58
The adoption of the Model Code of Evidence's definition of "client"
would not satisfactorily solve the problem, for the application of that
term within the organization would still remain uncertain. Any promul-
gation by the courts would be limited by the factual situation of the
particular case at hand. The only adequate solution, therefore, is legislative
enactment of a special privilege against disclosure which would modify
the confidentiality requirement to fit modern corporate practices, and
clearly define what persons in the organization would have a valid claim
to the privilege. In this way a general guide would be laid out, and the
courts could interpret factual situations within the framework of a
specific and detailed grant of privilege.5 7
Any legislative action of this sort would be most welcome, for it would
both grant the corporation the privilege desired and preserve the com-
mon law privilege for individuals in the same form as it has existed for
centuries.
GO Even the Radiant Burners decision concedes that a privilege should exist. "Due to
the large and complex nature of modem corporate business transactions corporations
should in fact be entitled to the attorney-client privilege." 209 F. Supp. at 325.
57 An attempt to formulate a judicial determination of "client" can be found in
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
